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Larson v. Buschkamp: The Effect of
Contribution on the Parent-Child Tort Immunity
Doctrine and Its Implications for Strict Liability
in Illinois
INTRODUCTION
The parent-child tort immunity doctrine prevents an uneman-
cipated minor from maintaining an action against his parent for
injuries resulting from the parent's negligence.1 Initially recog-
nized in 1891,2 the tort immunity doctrine was perceived as a
means of avoiding the family disharmony which stems from
intrafamily litigation.3 Various exceptions to the application of
the doctrine began to emerge, 4 however, and several jurisdic-
tions eventually abolished the immunity.5 Similarly, the advent
1. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956). A child may, however,
bring a contract action against his parent. Hinkle, Intrafamily Litigation-Parent and
Child, 1968 INs. L.J. 133.
2. The parent-child tort immunity doctrine first appeared in the United States in
Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). Hewellette held that a minor wrong-
fully committed to an insane asylum could not sue his mother for fraudulent im-
prisonment.
3. See, e.g., Gerrity v. Beatty, 71 Ill. 2d 47, 49, 373 N.E.2d 1323, 1324 (1978); Gulledge v.
Gulledge, 51111. App. 3d 972, 974, 367 N.E.2d 429, 431 (1977).
4. Exceptions to the tort immunity doctrine that have emerged in various jurisdictions
include: Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963) (no immunity where
the child is injured as an employee of his father); Begley v. Kohl & Madden Printing Ink
Co., 157 Conn. 445, 254 A.2d 907 (1969) (statutory abrogation of the immunity doctrine for
negligent operation of an automobile); Sisler v. Seeberger, 23 Wash. App. 612, 596 P.2d
1362 (1979) (no immunity bar if the defendant family member is dead).
5. Those jurisdictions which have abolished the parent-child tort immunity doctrine,
either partially or entirely, include: Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v.
Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648
(1971); Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1969); Nock-
tonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 611 P.2d 135 (1980); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921
(Ky. 1970); Sweeney v. Sweeney, 402 Mich. 234, 262 N.W.2d 625 (1978); Silesky v. Kelman,
281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Rupbert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013
(1974); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 24 A.2d 588 (1966); France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp.,
56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297
N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa.
372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Wood v.
Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 370 A.2d 191 (1977); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193
(1963).
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of contribution,6 comparative negligence, 7 and the pervasive role
of liability insurance8 gradually diminished the viability of this
tort immunity doctrine.9
Since its adoption in Illinois,1° the immunity doctrine has
withstood the challenges directed against it, although numerous
exceptions have been made." The recent judicial adoption of
contribution 12 and comparative negligence,' 3 however, has es-
tablished the policy in Illinois that liability should be distributed
in proportion to relative degrees of fault.' 4 In Larson v. Busch-
kamp, 5 an Illinois appellate court confronted a case of first
6. Contribution is the right of a tortfeasor to demand that a jointly responsible party
share in the amount of compensation awarded an injured plaintiff. W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 50, at 307 (4th ed. 1971). The Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, 12 U.L.A. 157 (1951), was initially adopted in Arkansas, Hawaii, Mary-
land, New Mexico, Rhode Island and South Dakota. See generally Note, Contribution
and Indemnity in Illinois Negligence Cases, 19 U. CHi. L. REV. 388 (1952).
7. For a list of jurisdictions which recognize some form of comparative negligence,
see Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 12-14, 421 N.E.2d 886, 891-92 (1981).
8. See generally Ingram & Barder, The Decline of Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 68
ILL B.J. 596 (1980); Comment, The Doctrine of Parental Immunity: Rule or Exception? 10
DE PAUL L. REv. 55 (1960).
9. The purpose of contribution is to make parties share the economic loss caused by
their wrongdoing. Consequently, focus should be centered upon the tortious conduct of
the parties, and any personal defense available to a tortfeasor is irrelevant. 1 HARPER &
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.2, at 718 (1956). See also Note, Immunity to a Direct
Action: Is It a Defense to a Contribution Claim? 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 151 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Immunity to a Direct Action]; Note, Contribution Among Joint Tortfea-
sors When One Tortfeasor Enjoys a Special Defense Against Action by the Injured Party,
52 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Note, Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors].
10. Illinois recognized the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill.
App. 577 (1895).
11. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956) (willful and wanton mis-
conduct); Cummings v. Jackson, 57 Ill. App. 3d 68, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (1978) (duty owed to
the general public); Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 277 N.E.2d 778 (1972) (dissolu-
tion of the family relationship through death of the defendant parent); Schenk v. Schenk,
100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968) (activity outside the family relationship).
12. The Illinois Supreme Court first recognized the right of contribution in Skinner v.
Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 111. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 111.
2d 16, cert. denied sub nom. Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach.
Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 48-64. The Illinois General
Assembly responded to this decision by enacting the Contribution Among Joint Tort-
feasors Act, ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 70, 301-305 (1981).
13. Illinois adopted comparative negligence with the decision of Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill.
2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 79-86.
14. See, e.g., Wirth v. City of Highland Park, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 430 N.E.2d 236
(1981); Erickson v. Gilden, 76 Ill. App. 3d 218, 394 N.E.2d 1076 (1979).
15. 105 Ill. App. 3d 965, 435 N.E.2d 221 (1982).
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impression regarding the intrinsic conflict between equitable dis-
tribution of loss and the parent-child tort immunity doctrine. The
court held that the immunity doctrine would not bar a contribu-
tion action between a defendant and the plaintiffs' father.
This comment will examine the adoption of the parent-child
tort immunity doctrine in Illinois, the development of its underly-
ing policies, and the exceptions carved from the doctrine. The
discussion will then shift to the recognition of contribution and
comparative negligence in Illinois, focusing upon these doctrines
as a means of equitably distributing loss. Notably, the conflict-
ing natures of the immunity doctrine and equitable loss distribu-
tion will be analyzed in the recent decision of Larson v. Busch-
kamp. Finally, the ramifications of Larson upon immunity and
contribution in a strict liability setting will be explored.
THE PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
Original Purposes
Illinois first recognized the parent-child tort immunity doctrine
with the decision of Foley v. Foley,16 where the minor plaintiff
sued his uncle for allegedly inflicting injuries and depriving him
of adequate medical treatment. Without providing support for its
conclusions, the appellate court ruled that "[i]t is doubtless the
law, that a child cannot maintain an action for damages on
account of maltreatment against a parent .... -17 Subsequent
decisions 18 expounded on this initial pronouncement, and the
policies underlying the parent-child tort immunity doctrine began
to emerge. The prohibition against a tort action between parent
and child was justified under five general theories: (1) preserva-
tion of family harmony; 19 (2) prevention of collusive claims
among family members; 20 (3) avoidance of intrafamily strife;21
16. 61 Ill. App. 577 (1895).
17. Id. at 580.
18. See infra notes 19-23.
19. Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34 Ill. 2d 451, 216 N.E.2d 137 (1966); Nudd v. Matsoukas,
7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Hogan v. Hogan, 106 Ill. App. 3d 104, 435 N.E.2d 770
(1982); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968).
20. Commentators have suggested that the existence of liability insurance might be
an impetus for family members to engage in collusive and fraudulent suits. See, e.g.,
Ingram & Barder, supra note 8, at 596.
21. Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner, 83 Ill. App. 3d 234, 403 N.E.2d 1256
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(4) promotion of a cooperative family atmosphere;22 and (5) pre-
servation of family funds. 23
These individual goals were eventually subsumed under the
concept of "family purpose," a talismanic description first used
in Schenk v. Schenk24 and illustrated in Eisele v. Tenuta.25 In
the latter decision, the plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile
driven by her son, sustained injuries when the car collided with
another. The plaintiff attempted to sue her son for negligent
operation of a motor vehicle, but was barred pursuant to the
parent-child tort immunity doctrine. Noting that the accident
occurred while the family members were driving to Wisconsin to
determine whether the son would attend a university there, the
appellate court held that the family trip arose naturally from the
family relationship and was directly related to the family pur-
pose. 26 Consequently, the tort immunity doctrine prevented the
plaintiff from suing her son for negligence.
The contours of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in Illi-
nois, therefore, encompass negligent conduct by a parent or child
during an activity arising pursuant to the family relationship or
furthering the family purpose.27 Because the threat of family
disharmony and depletion of family funds is more acute in such
a situation, Illinois courts have prohibited direct suits in negli-
gence between parent and child.28 Where, however, application
of the rule results in inequities or fails to further the purpose of
the rule, the doctrine is not applied.
(1980); Gulledge v. Gulledge, 51111. App. 3d 972, 367 N.E.2d 429 (1977); Johnson v. Myers,
2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 277 N.E.2d 778 (1972).
22. Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34 Ill. 2d 451, 216 N.E.2d 137 (1966); Schenk v. Schenk,
100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968).
23. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 156 A. 905 (1930); France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp.
56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
24. 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968). For a more detailed examination of
Schenk, see infra text accompanying notes 33-36. Briefly, Schenk involved a negligence
suit by a father against his daughter after she struck him with an automobile on a public
street. The appellate court rejected the argument that the cause of action arose pursuant
to the family relationship.
25. 83 Ill. App. 3d 799, 404 N.E.2d 349 (1980).
26. Id. at 802, 404 N.E.2d at 351.
27. The appellate court in Eisele was not persuaded by the plaintiffs argument that
the decision to attend the university was to be made soley by the son. Noting that the
defendant lived with the plaintiff and was unemancipated, the court found that the trip
arose in furtherance of the family relationship. Id. at 801-02, 404 N.E.2d at 351-52.
28. See, e.g., Hogan v. Hogan, 106 Ill. App. 3d 104,104, 435 N.E.2d 770, 770-71 (1982).
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Exceptions to the Parent-Child Tort Immunity Doctrine
Recognizing the inequities which sometimes arose through
imposition of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, 29 Illinois
courts created various exceptions to the rule. The first exception
arose in Nudd v. Matsoukas,30 in which the minor plaintiff
alleged willful and wanton misconduct against her father.
Although the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged the public
policies underlying the prohibition against negligence actions
between parent and child, it recognized that family harmony
would be neither preserved nor enhanced if a child were left
without redress for the more serious cause of action of willful and
wanton misconduct.31 In holding that the child's complaint stated
a cognizable cause of action, the supreme court noted that the
parent-child tort immunity doctrine had been judicially created
and could therefore be judicially modified.32
The second exception to the doctrine arose in Schenk v.
Schnek,33 in which the appellate court held that a child or par-
ent who is injured during an activity arising outside the family
relationship may maintain an intrafamily suit. In Schenk, a
father sued his daughter for negligence after she struck him with
an automobile on a public street. The appellate court found that
the duty owed the plaintiff by his daugther was the same duty
owed to all similarly situated pedestrians, and, therefore, the
cause of action did not arise pursuant to a family purpose.34 The
court determined that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine
was subject to modification where "impelling changes in condi-
tions exist," particularly since Nudd v. Matsoukas indicated that
29. The American rule of parent-child tort immunity is based upon the so-called
"great trilogy" of cases. France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970).
The earliest of these decisions was Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891),
discussed supra note 2. The second decision, McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77
S.W. 664 (1903), held that a child could not bring suit against her father despite alleged
inflictions of "cruel and inhuman treatment." Id. at 389, 77 S.W. at 664. Finally, in Roller
v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905), the parent-child tort immunity doctrine served as
an effective bar to an action for rape brought by a daughter against her father.
30. 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
31. Id. at 619, 131 N.E.2d at 531.
32. The supreme court in Nudd noted the pliability of a judicially created doctrine,
particularly where "prevalent considerations of public policy and social needs" mandate
a change of judicial position. Id.
33. 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968).
34. Id. at 203, 241 N.E.2d at 14.
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certain public policies could prevail over the doctrine.3 5 In addi-
tion, the court in Schenk rejected the argument that liability
insurance provided a basis for abrogating the parent-child tort
immunity doctrine. The court depicted such reasoning as an
"illogical expression of disenchantment with the immunity rule
and a baseless escape valve for a refusal to impose that rule. '36
A third exception to the parent-child tort immunity doctrine
was set forth in Johnson v. Myers37 in which the minor plaintiff
initiated a negligence action against her mother for injuries sus-
tained in an automobile accident. When the mother died subse-
quent to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff asserted that
the purposes of the immunity doctrine were inapplicable because
the parent-child relationship was dissolved through the death of
a parent.38 The appellate court agreed, permitting the plaintiff to
maintain her cause of action. The court justified its decision by
explaining that the immunity rule was predicated upon an
immunity to suit, not upon an absence of duty.39
The decisions applying the parent-child tort immunity doctrine
have thus carved out major exceptions to the rule, particularly
where the injury occurs outside the family relationship 40 or where
the policies inherent in the immunity doctrine are outweighed by
35. Id.
36. Id. at 205, 241 N.E.2d at 15. A case reaching a similar result to that in Schenk and
often described as carving an additional exception to the parent-child tort immunity doc-
trine is Cummings v. Jackson, 57 Ill. App. 3d 68, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (1978). In Cummings a
minor plaintiff was struck by a motorist outside her house. The child brought suit against
the city and her mother, alleging that the latter had violated a city ordinance by failing
to adequately trim the shrubs located between the house and the street, thereby blocking
the motorist's view. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiffs com-
plaint, finding that the duty owed the plaintiff was a general duty owed to the public, and
that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine would not preclude the suit. In a partial
dissent, Justice Weber called upon the judiciary to recognize the prevalent existence of
insurance as a basis for permitting intrafamily suits. He criticized the majority for
"defend[ing] to the death the collateral source rule on the one hand, and on the other,
carv[ing] out exceptions sub silentio by permitting some intrafamily litigation under the
guise of a general duty." Id. at 72, 372 N.E.2d at 1130.
37. 2 Ill. App. 5d 844, 277 N.E.2d 778 (1972).
38. Id. at 846, 277 N.E.2d at 779.
39. Id. at 845, 277 N.E.2d at 778-79. The court in Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d
68 (Mo. 1968), reached a similar conclusion in permitting the child to sue the representa-
tive of her deceased parent after the child was involved in an auto accident allegedly
caused by the parent's negligence.
40. E.g., Cummings v. Jackson, 57 Ill. App. 3d 68, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (1978); Schenk v.
Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Hogan v. Hogan, 106 Ill. App. 3d 104,
435 N.E.2d 770 (1982); contra Eisele v. Tenuta, 83 Ill. App. 3d 799, 404 N.E.2d 349 (1980).
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more compelling circumstances. 41 It is this latter judicial conces-
sion which has prompted litigants to assert that the doctrine no
longer retains a purposeful role in modem litigation.42
The original policies behind the doctrine, particularly the pres-
ervation of family harmony and family funds, have been signifi-
cantly overshadowed by the ubiquitous presence of liability insur-
ance. 43 Interestingly, the insurance policy maintained by a
child's parents actually fosters family tranquility by providing
proceeds which may be tapped by the injured child.44 While the
existence of insurance has been deemed a compelling factor in
abolishing the immunity doctrine in other jurisdictions,45 Illi-
nois courts generally have declined to recognize the widespread
existence of insurance when deciding an action between parent
and child.46 With the adoption of contribution and comparative
negligence, however, a new equitable theory of liability distribu-
tion emerged, and the survival of the parent-child tort immunity
doctrine was again challenged.
DISTRIBUTION OF LOSS RELATIVE TO FAULT
Judicial Recognition of Contribution
The abrogation of the common law rule prohibiting contribu-
41. E.g., Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Mroczynski v.
McGrath, 34 Ill. 2d 451, 216 N.E.2d 137 (1966); Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 277
N.E.2d 778 (1972).
42. See generally Hinkle, supra note 1; Comment, supra note 8.
43. In Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966), the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire noted that "as a practical matter, the prevalence of insurance cannot be
ignored in determining whether a court should continue to discriminate against a class of
individuals by depriving them of a right enjoyed by all other individuals." Id. at 434, 224
A.2d at 590.
44. The Supreme Court of Delaware in Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976),
stated that the existence of liability insurance tends to impersonalize a suit between par-
ent and child, and rebuts any threat of financial obligations concommitant with a child's
injury. Id. at 672. Moreover, as noted in Polelle, Illinois Family Immunity: The Unequal
Protection of Junior, 55 CHi. B. REc. 219, 219 (1974), it is the injury that disrupts family
harmony, and such disharmony will exist regardless of whether a cause of action is
permitted.
45. See, e.g., Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Briere v. Briere, 107
N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); contra
Welter v. Curry, 260 Ark. 287, 539 S.W.2d 264 (1976); Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del.
1979).
46. In Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Heap, 128 Ill. App. 2d 165, 262 N.E.2d
826 (1970), the court refused to consider the existence of liability insurance in a negli-
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tion among joint tortfeasors47 was judicially promulgated in
Illinois with the decision of Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division
Package Machinery C0.48 and its two companon cases. 49 The
plaintiff in Skinner filed a strict liability action against the
manufacturer of an injection molding machine after the plaintiff
was allegedly injured by design defects in the machine. The
manufacturer subsequently filed a third-party complaint against
the plaintiffs employer,50 seeking by way of contribution an
amount commensurate with the degree of misconduct attribut-
able to the employer. The circuit court dismissed the third-party
complaint pursuant to the employer's motion, and the appellate
court affirmed.
In reversing the rulings of the lower courts, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the prohibition against contribution among joint
tortfeasors was abolished. 51 The supreme court acknowledged
the inequities which stemmed from the right of indemnification, 52
gence action between parent and child on grounds that such evidence would be inadmiss-
ible at trial.
47. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799), is often
cited as the first decision denying contribution among joint tortfeasors. It has been noted,
however, that at the time of the decision, the concept of "tort" included intentional as
well as negligent acts, and the application of the no-contribution rule to negligent tortfea-
sors may have been inappropriate. See Note, A Judicial Rule of Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois, 1978 U. ILL LF. 633.
48. 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied sub nom.
Hinckley Plastic Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
49. Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 455 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d
41 (1978); Robinson v. International Harvester Co., 70 Ill. 2d 47, 374 N.E.2d 458 (1977),
modified, 70 Ill. 2d 47 (1978).
50. Skinner, 70 Ill. 2d at 5, 374 N.E.2d at 438. Specifically, the third-party complaint
requested that
if judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff and -against it [the defendant]
that judgment be entered against the third party defendant and in favor of the
third party plaintiff in such amount, by way of contribution, as would be com-
mensurate with the degree of misconduct attributable to the third party defend-
ant in causing the plaintiff's injuries.
Id.
51. Id. Previous decisions upholding the no-contribution rule in Illinois include: Muhl-
bauer v. Kruzel, 39 Ill. 2d 226, 234 N.E.2d 790 (1968); Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226
N.E.2d 630 (1967); Old Second Nat'l Bank v. Bynal Prod., Inc., 79 Ill. App. 3d 432, 398
N.E.2d 626 (1979); and Stanfield v. Medalist Indus., Inc. 17 Ill. App. 3d 996, 309 N.E.2d
104 (1974).
52. 70 Ill. 2d at 6-7, 374 N.E.2d at 439. Indemnity shifts the entire loss from one tort-
feasor who has been compelled to pay the loss to the plaintiff to the shoulders of another
who should bear the loss instead. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 50, at 306. See also Bua,
Third Party Practice In Illinois: Express And Implied Indemnity, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 287
(1976); Michael & Appel, Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors in Illi-
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compelling one tortfeasor to shoulder the entire loss. 53 Citing
Dean Prosser,5 4 the Supreme Court stated that a flagrant lack of
justice and common sense characterized a legal theory which
required one party to bear the financial obligations of two or
more equally responsible tortfeasors, thereby relieving a wrong-
doer of any liability.55
In addition to establishing the right of contribution, the
supreme court permitted the strictly liable defendant manufac-
turer to implead an employer for acts of misconduct. 56 Constru-
ing the third-party complaint as alleging misuse of the product
and assumption of the risk by the employer, the court deter-
mined that such conduct by the third-party defendant may have
contributed to the plaintiffs injuries. 57 Finally, the majority
allowed the manufacturer to seek contribution from the plain-
tiffs employer despite the fact that the employer was not amen-
able to direct suit by the plaintiff pursuant to the Workers' Com-
pensation Act.58
Three vigorous dissents 59 filed in Skinner questioned three
nois: A Need For Reform, 7 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 591 (1976); Sales, Contribution And Indem-
nity Between Negligent and Strictly Liable Tortfeasors 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 323 (1980).
53. 70 Ill. 2d at 6-7, 374 N.E.2d at 439. The majority opinion cites the 1976 Judicial
Conference in which the Study Committee on Indemnity, Third Party Actions and
Equitable Contributions unanimously recommended the adoption of contribution among
joint tortfeasors as a means of ameliorating the harsh results incurred through implied
indemnification. Id.
54. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 50, at 307. Prosser argues that responsibility is shifted
arbitrarily, falling upon the party with sufficient liability insurance, or upon the party
chosen by the plaintiffs whim. Id.
55. 70 Ill. 2d at 9, 374 N.E.2d at 442.
56. Id. at 16, 374 N.E.2d at 443. The Illinois Supreme Court held that
the third-party complaint, although pleaded in terms of negligence, alleges mis-
use of the product and assumption of risk on the part of the employer and states
a cause of action for contribution based on the relative degree to which the
defective product and the employer's misuse of the product or its assumption of
the risk contributed to cause plaintiffs injuries.
Id. The majority's construction of the third-party complaint generated considerable con-
cern among commentators who questioned the propriety of comparing the conduct of a
third-party defendant with the condition of an allegedly defective product. See, e.g., Appel
& Michael, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois: An Opportunity for Legis-
lative and Judicial Cooperation, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 169 (1979); Zaremski & Berns,
Skinner v. Reed-Prentice: Genesis of Comparative Fault in Illinois? 67 ILL. B.J. 334 (1979).
57. 70 111. 2d at 16, 374 N.E.2d at 443.
58. Id. at 17, 374 N.E.2d at 443. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 138 (1981). The majority
summarily dismissed the third-party defendant's immunity claim by noting that an
employer could be compelled to indemnify a third-party plaintiff and therefore could be
subjected to liability under a contribution theory. 70 111. 2d at 17, 374 N.E.2d at 443.
59. Separate dissents were filed by Chief Justice Ward and Justices Underwood and
Dooley.
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significant aspects of the majority opinion. First, the dissenters
argued that misuse and assumption of the risk had previously
been recognized as defenses to a strict liability suit and had
never provided the basis for an original or third-party action.60
Second, Justice Dooley criticized the majority for permitting a
comparison between the condition of the manufacturer's product
and the conduct of the employer, asserting that an examination
of fault or conduct was inappropriate in a strict liability action.6 1
Moreover, Justice Dooley argued that the policies underlying
strict liability62 warranted the imposition of liability upon one
who created the risk of a defective product, not upon one who
used the product.6 3 Finally, the majority's opinion was attacked
for allowing an employer, legislatively immunized against direct
suits by an employee, to be subjected to "limitless tort liability"
through a third-party action.64
An admitted digression from established Illinois law,65 the
Skinner decision prompted a series of questions,6 6 including the
viability of a contribution claim where the third-party defendant
60. 70 Ill. 2d at 31-32, 374 N.E.2d at 450-51 (1977) (Dooley, J., dissenting). Justice
Dooley stated that since 1837, assumption of risk had been utilized as a defense to an
original action and had never provided the basis for an original or third-party action. Id.
61. Id. at 24, 374 N.E.2d at 447. Justice Dooley stated:
How can there be a comparison between the manufacturer's fault and the
employer's fault, when fault is not the question? If the unreasonably dangerous
product is put in commerce and is a proximate cause of injury, how can contri-
bution and indemnification on the basis of the employer's negligence be in pro-
portion to the wrong of a manufacturer?
Id.
62. For an analysis of strict liability policies, see Suvada v. White, 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210
N.E.2d 182 (1965).
63. 70 Ill. 2d at 25, 374 N.E.2d at 448. Justice Dooley deemed it "well recognized" that
strict liability is not premised upon the concept of fault. He viewed as the motivating
factors behind the doctrine the public interest in life and health, the invitations by the
manufacturer to purchase products, and the inherent fairness in imposing liability upon
the party who reaps a profit from the sale of a defective product. Id.
64. Id. at 34-39, 374 N.E.2d at 452-55.
65. In response to the employer's argument that abolition of the no-contribution rule
posed such a substantial change in existing law that the legislature rather than the judi-
ciary was better equipped to implement such a change, the majority stated that it had
created the no-contribution rule and was therefore empowered and obligated to modify or
abolish it. Id. at 13-14, 374 N.E.2d at 442.
66. See generally Appel & Michael, supra note 56; Horan, Contribution In Illinois:
Skinner v. Reed-Prentice and Senate Bill 308, 61 CHI. B. REc. 331 (1980); Note, Skinner v.
Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co.: Adoption of Contribution In Illinois, 9
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1015 (1978).
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enjoys an immunity to a direct suit by the plaintiff.67 Although
the Skinner decision specifically permitted contribution despite
an employer-employee immunity, additional statutory6 and com-
mon law69 immunities had yet to be addressed within the frame-
work of contribution. In an attempt to confront and resolve such
issues, the Illinois General Assembly responded with legislation. 70
Enactment of the Contribution Statute
The Illinois legislature enacted an Act in Relation to Contribu-
tion Among Joint Tortfeasors, applicable to causes of action
arising on or after March 1, 1978. 71 In its legislative history, 72
the Civil Practice Committee73 articulated the inherent inequi-
ties resulting from the law of indemnification and expressed a
desire to compel joint tortfeasors to share equally in the financial
loss stemming from a plaintiff's injury.74 In an apparent response
67. Note, Immunity to a Direct Action, supra note 9, at 153; Note, Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeasors, supra note 9, at 408; Note, Comparative Contribution: The
Legislative Enactment of the Skinner Doctrine, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 173, 177 (1981).
68. See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 40, 1001 (1981) (The Intraspousal Immunity Doctrine);
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 85, 8-101 (1981) (Local Governmental and Governmental Employees
Tort Immunity Act).
69. See, e.g., the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, supra notes 1-5, 8-11 and accom-
panying text.
70. Public Act 81-601, entitled an Act in Relation to Contribution Among Joint Tort-
feasors, 1981 Ill. Laws 601 (codified at Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 70, 1$ 301-305 (1981)).
71. 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 70, 301-305 (1981).
72. In construing and interpreting legislation, legislative history and committee
comments may be examined to determine legislative intent. See, e.g., People v. Billings-
ley, 67 Ill. App. 2d 292, 297, 213 N.E.2d 765, 768 (1966); Wegren v. Barrett, 12 Ill. App. 3d
519, 522, 299 N.E.2d 567, 570 (1973).
73. CHICAGO BAR Assoc. CIVIL PRACTICE COMM., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BEHIND SENATE
BILL 308 1 [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.
74. The general objectives of the Contribution Act provide:
It is the view of the Civil Practice Committee that the prohibition against con-
tribution cannot be justified upon either a social or theoretical basis. As noted
by the Illinois Supreme Court in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice . . . there is an
obvious lack of common sense and justice in a ruling which permits the entire
burden of loss, for which two or more tortfeasors were responsible, to be cast
upon one entirely because of the accident of the successful levy of execution, the
existence of liability insurance, the plaintiffs whim or spite, or his collusion
with one of the wrongdoers. Likewise, the assertion that the Court should not be
used for the aid of tortfeasors is particularly empty under circumstances where
the Courts have long been used to permit tortfeasors to obtain indemnity.
Indemnity permits the shifting of the entire loss upon the theory that the party
seeking contribution was simply less culpable than the party from whom con-
tribution is sought.
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to the dissents raised in Skinner, the committee applied the Con-
tribution Act to actions encompassing different liability theories, 75
thereby allowing a defendant sued in strict liability to implead a
third party for negligence. Finally, the committee justified the
concept of contribution as a means of preventing the unjust
enrichment of one tortfeasor over another;76 it described contri-
bution as a "derivative right.., not barred by any common law
or statutory immunity which would preclude the prime claimant
from pursuing an action directly against the party from whom
contribution is sought."77 The intention of the Civil Practice
Committee appears clear, therefore, that no immunity may effec-
tively bar the right of one jointfeasor to seek contribution from
another equally responsible wrongdoer. 78
Adoption of Comparative Negligence
On April 17, 1981, the Illinois Supreme Court decided Alvis v.
Ribar,79 abolishing the doctrine of contributory negligence80 and
adopting the standard of pure comparative negligence8 l in Illi-
nois. The Supreme Court depicted comparative negligence as a
means by which parties could "recover the proportion of dam-
ages not attributable to their own fault," finding the intrinsic
75. Id. at 1-2. The committee expressly provided for the application of contribution to
those sued in strict liability as a joint tortfeasor. Id.
76. Id. at 2.
77. Id.
78. Not all legislators, however, perceived the prophylactic purpose of the Contribu-
tion Act:
Well, I told you the lawyers would get it back, you see, and whenever you say
that a bill here had been endorsed by the Bar Association and whether it's...
the Illinois Bar Association and then when you say it's also endorsed by the
Chicago Bar Association, boys, be careful, but what will happen here, is you
see, some guy pays the penalty. We have the right for.., so tortfeasor [sic] to
pay the whole thing and now there's two or three other [sic] involved after he
pays it he can turn around and sue each one of those so it's going to increase
litigtion. We were just talking about decreasing it a minute or two ago with
Senator Rock's bill and you know, the lawyers will get one-third of it all the
way around. No wonder it's endorsed.
Ill. S. Debates, 81st Gen. Assem. Apr. 23, 1979, at 173-74. (remarks of Sen. Knuppel).
79. 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
80. Contributory negligence is the doctrine which bars a negligent plaintiff from re-
covering against a negligent defendant. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 65, at 416-17. This
concept was first announced in Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
Illinois adopted the doctrine in Aurora Branch R.R. v. Grimes, 13 Ill. 585 (1852).
81. Pure comparative negligence compares the negligent conduct of both the plaintiff
and the defendant, and allows the plaintiff to recover to the extent that the plaintiff was
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"logic and fairness" of such apportionment to be virtually indis-
putable. 82 Noting the substantial number of jurisdictions which
had adopted some form of comparative negligence,83 the Illinois
Supreme Court recognized a "compelling public demand" to
adopt such a standard and provide litigants with a more equit-
able scheme for distribution of loss. 8 4 Moreover, the supreme
court acknowledged the existing right of contribution among
joint tortfeasors as set forth in Skinner, reiterating the policy
that liability should be apportioned on the basis of each defend-
ant's relative degree of fault.85 Even the dissents filed in Alvis v.
Ribar did not vigorously challenge the equities of comparative
negligence, but questioned whether the judiciary was the proper
mechanism through which such a legal development should
have been implemented.86
The judicial and legislative recognition of contribution and the
adoption of comparative negligence by the supreme court sug-
gests a strong policy interest in ameliorating existing inequities
and distributing loss among all responsible wrongdoers. A sig-
nificant departure from preexisting law,87 equitable loss distri-
bution and its implications have yet to be fully explored. 88 In
Larson v. Buschkamp,89 however, the traditional parent-child
tort immunity doctrine collided with the nascent theory of con-
tribution, and the attempt to equitably distribute loss was further
advanced.
not negligent. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab. Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975). Under
the modified form of comparative negligence, the plaintiff cannot recover if he is more
than 50 percent negligent. See, e.g., Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177
N.W.2d 513 (1970); See also Kionka, Comparative Negligence Comes to Illinois, 70 ILL.
B.J. 16 (1981).
82. 85111. 2d at 27, 421 N.E.2d at 898.
83. See supra note 7.
84. 85111. 2d at 16, 421 N.E.2d at 893.
85. See generally Halligan, Another Look At Consecutive Tortfeasors: Responsibility,
Indemnity, Contribution and Settlement, 70 ILL B.J. 236 (1981); Zaremski & Berns, supra
note 56.
86. 85 Ill. 2d at 29, 421 N.E.2d at 898 (1981) (Underwood, J., dissenting). Justices
Underwood and Ryan dissented to the majority's opinion. Justice Underwood stated that
although the decision was not unforeseen, it nonetheless constituted a radical change in
the law and should have been implemented by the legislature. Id.
87. See generally Ferrini, The Evolution From Indemnity to Contribution-A Ques-
tion of the Future, If Any, of Indemnity, 59 CHI. B. REc. 254 (1978); Widland, Contribution:
The End to Active-Passive Indemnity, 69 ILL B.J. 78 (1980); Note, Comparative Contribu-
tion: The Legislative Enactment of the Skinner Doctrine, 14 J. MAR L. REV. 173 (1980).
88. See supra note 67.
89. 105 Ill. App. 3d 965, 435 N.E.2d 221 (1982).
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LARSON V. BUSCHKAMP
Facts
In Larson v. Buschkamp, the plaintiffs were passengers in an
automobile driven by their father, Robert Larson. The plaintiffs
sustained injuries in a collision with a car driven by Helen
Buschkamp, an employee of Keystone Printing Services, Inc.
The children's mother filed suit on their behalf, naming Busch-
kamp, Keystone and Robert Larson as defendants, and alleging
that each driver negligently operated a motor vehicle.90
Buschkamp and Keystone subsequently brought a counter-
claim against Robert Larson, seeking contribution pursuant to
the Contribution Act.91 Larson moved to dismiss both the origi-
nal complaint and the counterclaim on the ground that the
parent-child tort immunity doctrine barred such actions.92 The
trial court sustained the father's motion to dismiss, reasoning
that Larson was not amenable to a direct suit by his children
and consequently could not be subjected to liability under a con-
tribution theory.93 The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second
District reversed and held that the parent-child tort immunity
doctrine did not pose a substantive bar to a contribution claim
against the father of minor plaintiffs. 94
Case Analysis of the Parent-Child Tort Immunity Doctrine
The appellate court's analysis in determining whether contri-
bution could be sought from the parent of an-injured child com-
menced with an examination of the parent-child tort immunity
doctrine. 95 Tracing the doctrine to its origins, the court recog-
nized that preservation of family harmony was deemed a suffi-
ciently compelling reason to warrant the prohibition of tort
actions between parent and child. 96 The court enumerated three
90. Id. at 966-67, 435 N.E.2d at 223.
91. Id. See ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70, 302 (1981).
92. 105 Ill. App. 3d at 967, 435 N.E.2d at 223.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 970-71, 435 N.E.2d at 225-26.
95. Id. at 967, 435 N.E.2d at 223.
96. Id. at 968-69, 435 N.E.2d at 224. See also Perchel v. District of Columbia, 444 F.2d
997 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Hewellette v.
George, 68 Miss. 703,9 So. 885 (1891); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1968).
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goals underlying the adoption of the immunity doctrine in Illi-
nois: (1) preservation of parental authority and family tranquil-
ity; (2) prevention of the depletion of family funds; and (3) pre-
vention of fraudulent claims.97 The Larson court concluded its
initial analysis of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine with
the generalization that the doctrine bars direct tort suits between
parent and child if the cause of action arises during pursuit of a
family purpose or in furtherance of the family relatonship. 98
Acknowledging the series of exceptions which emerged from
the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, the appellate court cate-
gorized the general situations within which the immunity doc-
trine would not prevail: (1) allegations of willful and wanton
misconduct by one family member against another; 99 (2) dissolu-
tion of the family relationship through death;100 (3) breach of a
duty owed the general public;10 1 and (4) infliction of an injury
during an activity outside the family relationship. 10 2 The court
concluded that although the parent-child tort immunity doctrine
retains some degree of vitality, the doctrine will not apply where
the policies and purposes underlying the rule are not served. 10 3
Reliance upon Wirth v. City of Highland Park
The discussion in Larson then shifted to the applicability of
contribution where an immunity defense exists between the
plaintiff and the third party. The court placed considerable
emphasis upon the decision of Wirth v. City of Highland Park,0 4
in which a third-party plaintiff was permitted to seek contribu-
tion from a third-party defendant despite the presence of an
intraspousal immunity between the plaintiff and third-party
defendant. The plaintiff in Wirth allegedly sustained injuries
when she fell down a stairway in a building owned by the
defendant. The plaintiff initiated a negligence action against the
97. 105 III. App. 3d at 968, 435 N.E.2d at 223.
98. Id. at 969, 435 N.E.2d at 223.
99. Id. at 968, 435 N.E.2d at 223 (citing Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 619, 131
N.E.2d 525, 531 (1956)).
100. Id. (citing Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 846, 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (1972)).
101. Id. at 969, 435 N.E.2d at 223; see also Cummings v. Jackson, 57 Ill. App. 3d 68,
372 N.E.2d 1127 (1978).
102. 105 Ill. App. 3d at 968, 435 N.E.2d at 223; see also Schenk v. Schenk, 100 IIl. App.
2d 199, 206, 241 N.E. 2d 12, 15 (1968).
103. 105 Ill. App. 3d at 969, 435 N.E.2d at 223.
104. 102 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 430 N.E.2d 236 (1981).
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defendant, who in turn sought contribution from the plaintiffs
husband, alleging that he negligently maintained the stairway.10 5
The husband moved to dismiss the third-party complaint pursu-
ant to the intraspousal immunity doctrine,10 6 but the trial court
denied the motion. The husband appealed.
In affirming denial of the motion, the appellate court in Wirth
weighed the policies underlying the intraspousal immunity doc-
trine against the purposes behind contribution. 07 The court
viewed the adoption of contribution as a reaction to the "harsh
results" associated with a no-contribution rule and perceived any
compromise of the Contribution Act or comparative negligence
as an impediment to the development of such legal doctrines. 10 8
Drawing upon the equitable considerations articulated in Skinner
and Alvis, the Wirth court concluded that the trend in Illinois is
to distribute loss in relation to fault, regardless of whether an
immunity defense exists between the plaintiff and third-party
defendant. 109
In addition, the court in Wirth described the intraspousal
immunity doctrine as a procedural rather than as a substantive
bar to tort actions between spouses. 110 Pursuant to this charac-
105. Id. at 1075, 430 N.E.2d at 238.
106. Id. See ILL REV. STAT. ch. 40, 1001 (1981).
107. The appellate court traced the origins of the intraspousal immunity doctrine to
the common law that provided that upon marriage, the wife's legal existence merged into
and was converged with that of her husband's. With the enactment of ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
40, 1001-1002 (1981), the Married Woman's Act, a married woman became free to own
and convey property, contract, and incur liabilities. This statute was subsequently
construed as permitting one spouse to maintain a tort action against another spouse.
Brandt v. Keller, 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952). The legislature responded by amend-
ing the Act and establishing an intraspousal tort immunity defense. ILL REV. STAT. ch.
40, 1001 (1981). See generally Tonner, The Decline of Intraspousal Immunity in Illinois,
47 INs. CouNs. J. 573 (1980).
108. 102 II. App. 3d at 1080, 430 N.E.2d at 241.
109. Specifically, the court stated that "[tihe recent trend in Illinois has been to curtail
common law tort doctrines to allow contribution among joint tortfeasors." Id.
110. Id. The appellate court relied upon the decision of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Elkins, 77
Ill. 2d 384, 396 N.E.2d 528 (1979), wherein the wife and daughter of the plaintiff's policy
holder were injured in an automobile accident. Because the injured parties were denied
insurance coverage pursuant to an exclusionary clause, they sought compensation under
the uninsured motorist clause. The plaintiff contended that the intraspousal immunity
doctrine precluded such recovery, but the Illinois Supreme Court rejected this argument.
The supreme court held that the statutory immunity doctrine did not "destroy the cause
of action of the injured spouse, but [conferred] immunity upon the tortfeasor spouse,
which like a defense based upon the statute of limitations can be waived by the defend-
ant spouse." Id. at 390, 396 N.E.2d at 531.
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terization of the immunity doctrine, the court found that a cause
of action between spouses may exist but be unenforceable.'
Consequently, when the procedural bar is removed, as in a third-
party action, the cause of action becomes enforceable and the
right to seek contribution permissible. 1 2 The court concluded by
holding that the intraspousal immunity defense to a direct suit
by a spouse does not impair the right of a defendant to seek con-
tribution from a negligent spouse." 3
Conclusion of Larson
Drawing extensively from the Wirth analysis, the court in
Larson reasoned that a claim for contribution poses no greater
threat to the stability of the parent-child relationship than that
feared in the husband-wife situation.114 The court acquiesced in
the view that the child's injury rather than the intrafamily lit-
igation constitutes the greater source of family disruption 1 5 and
that the widespread existence of liability insurance diminishes
the possibility that family funds may be exhausted.1 6 Invoking
the reasoning of Wirth and recognizing the growing trend in
Illinois towards equitable loss distribution, the Larson court
concluded that no overriding policy considerations compel the
application of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in a con-
tribution claim.117
In dicta, the appellate court recognized the potential conflict
between the parent-child tort immunity doctrine and contribu-
tion where the third-party plaintiff alleges negligent supervision
of a child by the parent."8 Although acknowledging that some
111. 102 Ill. App. 3d at 1081,430 N.E.2d at 242.
112. Id.
113. Id. The appellate court noted that the Contribution Act did not contain any spe-
cific language that exempted parties with an immunity defense from the right of contri-
bution. Id.
114. 105 Il. App. 3d at 967, 969-70, 435 N.E.2d at 223-25.
115. Id. at 970, 435 N.E.2d at 225. See generally Polelle, supra note 44, at 220.
116. 105 IM. App. 3d at 970, 435 N.E.2d at 225. The court in Larson stated that "[t]he
widespread use of liability insurance mitigates against the possibility that such suits
disrupt the domestic peace or deplete the family's financial resources. (Williams v.
Williams (Del. 1976), 369 A.2d 669; France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp. (1970), 56 N.J. 500,
267 A-2d 490)." Id. at 971, 435 N.E.2d at 226.
117. Id. at 971, 435 N.E.2d at 225.
118. Id.
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jurisdictions uphold the immunity doctrine in such situations,
the court declined to address the issue, noting that the pleadings
therein only alleged negligent operation of a motor vehicle and
not negligent supervision of a child."19
POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF LARSON V. BUSCHKAMP
IN A STRICT LIABILITY ACTION
The application of Larson v. Buschkamp in a strict liability
action presents the possibility of a significant conflict between
the parent-child tort immunity doctrine and contribution. The
Skinner decision 120 allowed a manufacturer, sued under a strict
liability theory, to seek contribution from the user of an allegedly
defective product, thereby creating the concept of "downstream
contribution."'121 Larson permitted an allegedly negligent defend-
ant to seek contribution from the plaintiffs' father, rejecting the
argument that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine bars such
a claim. Thus, the convergence of these two decisions would
allow a manufacturer, sued in strict liability by an injured child,
to seek contribution from the plaintiffs parent.
To illustrate, assume hypothetically that six-year-old Jane Doe
is injured when she picks up a power saw while left unattended
in her back yard. Jane files a strict liability action against the
119. Id. The appellate court cited Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979), and
France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970) in support of its position.
These decisions are discussed in greater detail infra note 125.
120. 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied sub nom.
Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 746 (1978).
121. "Downstream" liability refers to that imposed upon subsequent users or consu-
mers of an allegedly defective product. "Upstream" liability is that imposed upon those
who are responsible for placing the product into the stream of commerce. Stevens v.
Silver Mfg. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 455 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 41 (1978). Prior to
the decision in Skinner, manufacturers suing in strict liability were precluded from seek-
ing downstream indemnification from users or consumers. Stanfield v. Medalist Indus.,
Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 996, 309 N.E.2d 104 (1974). In Stanfield, the Illinois Appellate Court
stated:
It appears that the liability in these cases is qualitatively active so far as the
seller or manufacturer is concerned and because of his unique relationship to
the product as its creator, his negligence cannot be offset against that of a mere
subsequent user. We conclude, therefore, that actions founded on strict liability
for defective and unreasonably dangerous products are outside the active-
passive theory of indemnity. Hence, third-party actions for indemnity against
subsequent users are not maintainable by the manufacturer or seller of the
defective product.
Id. at 1000, 309 N.E.2d at 108.
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power saw manufacturer, alleging that her injuries were proxi-
mately caused by a defectively designed safety switch. The
manufacturer then files a third-party contribution action against
Jane's father, John Doe, alleging that his failure to supervise
Jane constituted negligence and contributed to her injuries.
Within such a hypothetical framework, the policies underlying
contribution and the parent-child tort immunity doctrine are
polarized, presenting two significant problems. First, if the manu-
facturer prevails in his contribution claim, an individual consum-
er is compelled to share the financial obligations which result
when a plaintiff is injured by a defective product. 122 Moreover,
this economic loss is imposed upon the parent of an injured
child, thereby threatening the depletion of family funds and
causing family disharmony. 123 Second, the basis for the contri-
bution claim against John Doe is negligent supervision of his
child, 124 a challenge directed at the essence of parental authority
and the core of the family relationship.125 Each of these consid-
erations will now be analyzed.
The Problems of Requiring the User of a
Defective Product to Share Economic Loss
In Skinner, the third-party defendant (plaintiff s employer)
argued that the policies underlying strict liability warrant the
imposition of liability solely upon the party who creates the risk
of a defective product and who reaps a profit through the manu-
facture and sale of such a product. 126 The Illinois Supreme Court
122. In Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), the Illinois
Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of strict liability and stated that liability for a
consumer's injuries should be placed on the party who creates the risk of a defective
product and reaps pecuniary gains through its sale. Id. at 617, 210 N.E.2d at 186.
123. See, e.g., France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A-2d 490 (1970); Falco
v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
124. In Larson, the Illinois Appellate Court specifically noted that the counter-
claimant's allegations against Robert Larson did not allege negligent supervision, but
rather, negligent operation of a motor vehicle. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
125. In Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979), a father brought suit on behalf of
his child when the child was kicked by a horse owned by the defendant. The defendant
sought contribution against the father on the ground of negligent parental supervision,
but the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the third-party complaint.
Noting that parental supervision consists of authority and a personal exercise of judg-
ment, the court feared the disruption of family harmony if negligent parental supervision
constituted the basis of a third-party action. Id. at 685.
126. 70 Ill. 2d at 14, 374 N.E.2d at 443. See Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc.,57 Ill. 2d 542,
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recognized this argument as reflective of the fundamental policy
behind strict liability127 but found the goal satisfied once the
manufacturer of an allegedly defective product was named a
defendant in the original action.128 Consequently, the court fore-
saw no serious infringement upon the strict liability doctrine by
allowing the user of a defective product to share the financial
liability with the manufacturer. 129
It is significant, however, that the third-party defendant in
Skinner was a major employer and products manufacturer.130
Although admittedly a downstream user of an allegedly defec-
tive product, the employer was nonetheless in a position to jus-
tify imposition of contribution in a strict liability action. First,
the employer in Skinner arguably possessed a degree of expertise
and experience in anticipating and guarding against the hazards
of the product. The same degree of sophistication cannot be
attributed to an individual consumer such as John Doe, who
purchases a power saw with a defective safety switch. Notably,
the disparity of knowledge between a consumer and manufac-
turer regarding such defects represents a primary motivation
behind the adoption of strict liability.' 31 To compel John Doe to
contribute to the manufacturer's financial burden would emascu-
late the policies underlying strict liability.
Second, the employer in Skinner was in a stronger position
than an individual consumer to absorb and distribute any eco-
nomic loss. -John Doe cannot, absent sufficient liability insur-
ance, withstand the financial obligations attendant to contribu-
tion. To permit contribution in such an action allows the manu-
facturer to share its loss with a consumer, shifting a portion of
the responsibility from one who creates the risk of a defective
316 N.E.2d 516 (1974); Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976);
Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
127. 70 Ill. 2d at 14, 374 N.E.2d at 443. In Skinner, the Illinois Supreme Court recog-
nized that the policies underlying strict liability were motivated by the desire to impose
the economic loss upon "the one who created the risk and reaped the profit, including
everyone from the manufacturer on through to the seller or any one of them." Id.
128. Id. Specifically, the court stated that "[wihen the economic loss of the user has
been imposed upon a defendant in a strict liability action the policy considerations of
Suvada are satisfied and the ordinary equitable principles governing the concepts of
indemnity or contribution are to be applied." Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 4, 374 N.E.2d at 438.
131. See, e.g., Thomas v. Kaiser Agric. Chem., 81 111. 2d 206, 407 N.E.2d 32 (1980);
Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 405 (1970).
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product to one who is unable to anticipate it, prevent it, or absorb
the loss. Moreover, in the absence of adequate insurance, John
Doe is compelled to exhaust family funds to contribute to the
liability resulting from his child's injury. The ensuing family
discord represents the precise danger that the parent-child tort
immunity doctrine was designed to prevent,132 warranting con-
tinued application of the doctrine in such a situation. Despite the
trend in Illinois to equitably distribute loss among responsible
tortfeasors, the inequities resulting from contribution by the par-
ent of an injured child mandate an exception to the trend.
The Dangers of Seeking Contribution for Negligent Supervision
In the hypothetical situation, the manufacturer's contribution
claim against John Doe alleges negligent supervision of the
minor plaintiff. Unlike the allegations of negligent driving pre-
sented in Larson, where negligent driving by a parent threatens
the public's safety, allegations of negligent supervision challenge
the essence of parental authority. 133 Supervision of a child en-
compasses discretion, judgment and discernment on behalf of a
parent,13 4 a domain not willingly invaded by the judiciary.135 To
allow a manufacturer contribution on the basis of negligent
supervision by a parent would undermine the flexibility and
individuality intrinsic to parental authority.
Moreover, the strength of the family relationship is premised
upon the ability of family members to co-exist without excessive
interference from external sources. 136 The need for enforcement
of regulations and standards regarding automobile driving are
not as compelling in a situation encompassing parental supervi-
sion. 137 The manufacturer's contribution claim against John
Doe constitutes a significant intrusion into the realm of the fam-
ily relationship, and threatens the domestic tranquility which
the parent-child tort immunity doctrine seeks to preserve. The
132. See supra notes 8, 42.
133. See, e.g., Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979).
134. Id. at 684.
135. The familial domain has been given constitutional dimensions in some situations.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Conneticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
136. See, e.g., Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979).
137. Id. at 684.
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potential disruption of family harmony and invasion of parental
discretion mandates a limited application of Larson v. Busch-
kamp.
CONCLUSION
The parent-child tort immunity doctrine retains a meaningful
role in modern litigation. Imbued with the purpose of preventing
intrafamily disharmony, the doctrine is nonetheless threatened
with abrogation by the development of equitable loss distribu-
tion and contribution. The equities, however, do not materialize
when contribution results in a significant encroachment upon
parental supervision and disruption of domestic tranquility. A
continued judicial awareness of the policies underlying the tort
immunity doctrine must be maintained if the salutary purposes
of the doctrine are to prevail.
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